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N. E. 14 (1930); People v. Lawson,
345 IMI. 428, 178 N. E. 62 (1931).
The credibility of the testimony of
A substantial number of states
an accomplice has given rise to have the same rule, that a convicvarious rules governing its weight tion can be had without corroborain convictions based almost wholly tion if the testimony proves guilt
upon such evidence. In a recent beyond a reasonable doubt. State
Illinois case, People v. Karatz, 365 v. Cianflone, 98 Conn. 454, 120 AtI.
347 (1923); Caldwell v. State, 50
Ill. 255, 5 N. E. (2d) 842 (1937),
it was stated that a conviction pro- Fla. 4, 39 So. 188 (1905); Stone v.
cured on the uncorroborated testi- State, 118 Ga. 705, 45 S. E. 630
(1903); State v. Vandeveer, 119
mony of an accomplice "will not be
molested where the facts and cir- Kan. 674, 240 Pac. 407 (1925);
cumstances testified to by such ac- Commonwealth v. Boswofth, 39
complice, when weighted and tested Mass. 397 (1839); People v. Nunn,
according to the established rules 120 Mich. 530, 79 N. W. 800 (1899);
applicable thereto, are sufficient to State v. Shaffer, 253 Mo. 320, 1'61
prove guilt beyond a reasonable S. W. 805 (1913); State v. Broke,
doubt."
In this case, however, 99 Ore. 310, 195 Pac. 583 (1921);
there was evidence strongly tend- State v. Sowell, 85 S. C. 278, 67 S.
ing to corroborate the accomplice. E. 316 (f910); Draper v. CommonThe court also remarked that the wealth, 132 Va. 648, 11 S. E. 471
(1922); State v. Stapp, 65 Wash.
law was well settled that the record
must be free from substantial and 438, 118 Pac. 337 (1911). This is
prejudicial error. People v. Gor- the rule prevailing in the federal
don, 344 Ill. 422, 176 N. E. 722 courts. Ahearn v. United States,
(1931) noted (1932) 22 J. Crim. L. 158 Fed. 606 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907),
743. The "established rules applicert. denied, 208 U. S. 615 (1908);
cable thereto" have reference to the Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.
Illinois practice that the jury S. 470 (1917). Connecticut, in the
should be instructed to consider the case cited, treated the accomplice
testimony of an accomplice with the same as any other witness. In
great care and caution (Hoyt v. PeoEngland the rule is that the judge
ple, 140 Ill. 588, 30 N. E. 315 (1892)),
should tell the jury that it is withand should not give it the same ef- in their legal province to convict
fect as that of other witnesses. upon the uncorroborated evidence,
People v. Rongetti, 338 Ill. 56, 170 but he should warn them of the

EVIDENCE-TESTIMONY OF AccoMPUCE-CORROBORATION. - [Illinois]
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dangers of such testimony. If he
fails to give warning the conviction
will not stand. Rex v. Baskerville
[1916] 2 K. B. 658; Note, Corroboration of Accomplice's Testimony
(1934) 77 L. J. 336. The same rule
obtains in Canada. See Greenshields, The Accomplice as a Witness (1929) 7 Can. B. Rev. 520,
528 et seq.
Other states hold that there must
be corroboration-with or without
the aid of statute. A typical statute provides that the corroborating
testimony must tend to connect
the defendant with the offense; if
it merely shows the commission of
the offense or the circumstances
thereof, it is not sufficient. ALA.
CODE Ann. (Mitchie, 1928) §5635;
ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford &
Moses, 1921) §3181; CAL. PEN. CODE
(Deering, 1931) §1111; N. Y. Cnmm.
CODE (Gilbert, 1936) §399; S. D.
Comp. LAws (1929) §4882; Tsx.
ANN. CODE Cnnw. Pnoc. (Vernon,
1936) art. 718. In such jurisdictions the question remains as to
what is sufficient corroboration.
The following examples will suffice to show the general requirements of sufficiency. It is not essential that the corroborative evidence in and of itself be sufficient
to warrant a verdict, or that it corroborate in every detail (Dixon v.
State, 116 Ga. 186, 42 S. E. 357
(1902)); it need go only to some
material part of the accomplice's
testimony (State v. Jones, 115 Iowa
115, 88 N. W. f96 (1901);Drew v.
State, 65 P. (2d) 549 (Okla. Cr.
App. 1937)), but it should tend in
some degree to show the guilt of
the accused. State v. Clements, 82
Minn. 434, 85 N. W. 229 (1901). A
grave suspicion of guilt is not
enough. Harrel v. State, 121 Ga.
607, 49 S. E. 703 (1905). However,
the corroboration is sufficient if it

shows the accomplice testified truly
in some particulars and justifies the
inference that he testified truly in
others. Keliher v. United States,
193 Fed. 8 (C. C. A. 1st, 1912);
State v. Arhontis, 196 Iowa 223, 194
N. W. 209 (1923). California, having a statute like that above, requires the corroboration to be effective for more than merely raising a suspicion of guilt (People v.
Davis, 210 Cal. 540, 293 Pac. 32
(1930)), though it is sufficient if
the connection of the defendant
with the commission of the offense
may be inferred therefrom. People
v. Whittaker, 63 P. (2d) 1202 (Cal.
App. 1937); People v. Rokes, 64 P.
(2d) 746 (Cal. App. 1937) (admissions of defendants); Hargett v.
State, 189 S. E. 675 (Ga. App. 1937)
(slight evidence from extraneous
source). New York, following its
statute, states that the cbrroboration must lead to the inference that
a crime was committed and that the
accused was implicated. People v.
Evans, 143 N. Y. S. 49 (1913). But
though the statute provides that
the corroboration must go to the
extent of connecting defendant
with the crime, the court has said
that this need not show the commission of the crime, nor defendant's connection therewith, nor
need it be restricted to any particular point, but is sufficient if it
merely tends to connect him in
such a way as may reasonably
satisfy the jury that the accomplice
is telling the truth. People v.
Crum, 272 N. Y. 348, 6 N. . (2d)
51 (1937); People v. Dixon, 231 N.
Y. 111, 131 N. E. 752 (1921). Montana holds that the statute is satisfied if the independent evidence
tends to connect the defendant with
the crime. State v. Ritz, 65 Mont.
180, 211 Pac. 298 (1922). Accord:
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Shields v. Commonwealth, 203 Ky.
118, 261 S. W. 865 (1924).
Such are the rules governing the
testimony of an accomplice. Which
rule is wisest is hard to say. It
seems that no state allows a conviction solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice
unless it alone proves guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Most states
require that it be considered with
grave caution and suspicion, and,
as in Illinois, it is reversible error
not to so instruct the jury. Except
in a very few jurisdictions the testimony cannot be considered in the
same light as that of any other witness. On the other hand are those
states requiring corrobation. Yet,
even when a statute enforces this
rule, it is found that the slightest
corroboration is sufficient-it need
go only to some material fact or
tend to connect the defendant with
the commission of the crime. The
strict limitations imposed by those
states such as Illinois, compared
with the extreme laxity of such
states as California or New York,
leads one to conclude that after all,
the rules tend to merge and the
same result is ultimately reached,
whichever is applied.
CHARLES B. RoBisoN.
WITNESSES - BASTARDY PROCEEDINGs-TETIONY BY WIFE or NON-

AccEss OF HuSBAND. - [Pennsylvania]
Prosecutrix, a married
woman, in a prosecution for fornication and bastardy, and failure
to support an illegitimate child,
testified as sole witness that she
had intercourse with the defendant
as a result of which a child was
born, and that she had been separated from her husband for a period of three and one-half years during which time she had neither
seen nor had sexual relations with

him. Defendant was convicted upon this testimony. On appeal, reversed. Held: A wife whose husband is living and undivorced cannot be permitted to bastardize her
child by testifying to her husband's
non-access. Commonwealth v. Di
Matteo, 188 AtI. 425 (Pa. 1936).
A strong presumption has always existed that a child born of
a married woman, whose husband
is alive, is legitimate. See Note
(1931) 25 Ill. L. Rev. 561. Prior
to the eighteenth century, however,
there was no definite rule concerning the testimony of either spouse
to prove non-access of husband as
evidence of a child's illegitimacy.
4 Wicaopx, EviDENCE (2d. ed. 1923)
§2063. Lord Mansfield in Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591 (1777),
set forth for the first time, as
obiter dictum, the rule that "Declarations of a father or mother
cannot be admitted to bastardize
the issue born after marriage."
This rule, stated to be predicated
upon "decency, morality and policy," has been severely condemned
by Professor Wigmore. 4 WiGmoRE
§2063-64. HoweVer, the fact remains that Lord Mansfield's .rule
has been accepted in many jurisdictions in this country. Illustrative of these are Iowa and Texas.
In Craven v. Selby, 216 Iowa 505,
246 N. W. 821 (1933), a suit to partition property, the court held that
a wife cannot establish the illegitimacy of her son born in wedlock by testifying to the non-access
of her husband. In United States
Fidelity and GuaranteeCo. v. Henderson, 53 S. W. (2d) 811 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932) a proceeding to
set aside a compensation award,
the English rule and the underlying reasons therefor were unequivocally adopted.
A problem of interpretation aris-
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ing under the non-access rule is
whether a wife is precluded from
giving

only direct testimony

non-access

of

of her husband, or

field rule is artificial and unsound.
Being so, it should neither be used
to suppress the truth nor to prevent substantig justice." However,
in Martin v. Stillie, 129 Kan. 19;
281 Pac. 925 (f925), an action for
the recovery of real property, the
court reverted to the Mansfield
doctrine in its entirety. It may be
significant to add that the court
felt that the action had become a
public nuisance; perhaps the old
rule was revived only to suppress
further litigation.
From time to time statutes have
been passed in the various states
affecting the admissibility of the
kind of testimony in question. Some
of these are Bastardy Acts with
provisions for competent witnesses.
Others are general evidence statutes liberalizing common-law precedent. In State v. Soyka, 181
Minn. 533, 233 N. W. 300 (1930),
a statute made every person of
sufficient understanding, including
the parties, competent to testify in
any action. Mimh. STAT. (Mason,
1927) §9814. Under this provision
both husband and wife were held
competent to give evidence that the
former was not the father of a
child of the wife. In re McNamara's
Estate, 181 Cal. 82, 183 Pac. 552
(f919), cites the California Code
of Civil Procedure (Deering, 1931)
§1879, providing that "all persons,

whether she is also precluded from
testifying to collateral facts from
which non-access may be inferred.
In Franks v. State, 26 Ala. 430, 1'61
So. 549 (1935), it was stated that
"She may testify to circumstances
from which non-access may be inferred, but she may not testify that
her spouse is not the father." Accord: Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark.
113, 173 S. W. 842 (1918); State v.
Green, 210 N. C. 162, 185 S. E. 670
(1936): This interpretation of the
Mansfield rule permits the wife to
do indirectly what she could not do
directly. See criticism in 4 WIGMORE §2064.
A more reasonable
interpretation is taken by other
courts in prohibiting testimony of
collateral facts as well as direct
evidence showing non-access. In
re Wright's Estate, 237 Mich. 375,
21f N. W. 746 (1927); Scanlon v.
Walshe, 118 Md. 131, 31 Atl. 498(1895); In re McDermott's Estate,
125 Neb. 179, 249 N. W. 555 (1933);
Bell v. Territory, 8 Okla. 75, 56 Pac.
853 (1899); Richter v. Richter, 117
Ore. 673, 245 Pac. 321 (1926);
Koenig v. State, 215 Wis. 658, 255
N. W. 727 (1934). The Kentucky
court, in Veron's Adm'r v. Veron,
228 Ky. 56, f4 S. W. (2d) 185
(1925), intimated that the wife may without exception . . ." may be
testify only where there is other witnesses, and holds that on the
testimony showing non-access of basis of this statute a wife is to be
the husband. In Kansas the law is permitted to testify to the nonunsettled. In Lynch v. Rosenber- access of her husband.
In re
ger, 121 Kan. 601, 249 Pac. 682 Wray's Estate, 93 Mont., 525, 19 P.
(2d) 1051 (1933), involving a stat(1926), an action for partition of a
deceased's estate, the testimony of ute similar to the one in California
the mother was admissible to prove (MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. (Andernon-access. This case, using Proson & McFarland, 1935) §10534),
fessor Wigmore's arguments, atand also a bastardy statute permittacks the Mansfield rule. "In our ting rebuttal of the presumption of
opinion the so-called Lord Mans- legitimacy (Id. §5832) specifically
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states that "our legislature has abrogated the common-law-or better say-the Mansfield rule." Cf.
Adams v. Adams, 102 Vt. 318, 148
Atl. 287 (1930) (rule not applicable in divorce cases). In the
state of Arkansas a bastardy statute makes a mother a competent
witness in bastardy cases, unless
she is legally incompetent in any
case. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford
& Moses, 1921) §783. However, it
was held in Kennedy v. State,
supra, that to make the mother
competent to testify to the nonaccess of her husband an express
statute was necessary. Lord Mansfield is cited with approval. Accord: Scott v. State, 173 Ark. 625,
292 S. W. 979 (1927). The bastardy statute in West Virginia provides that a married woman may
not accuse a person other than her
husband unless she has lived apart
from him for at least one year. W.
VA.

CODE

ANN.

(Mitchie,

1932)

§4770. Another statute makes both
"husband and wife competent and
compellable witnesses to testify for
and against each other to any and
all relevant matters, including the
fact of such marriage and the parentage of such child .

.

.

."

Id.

§4781. In State v. Reed, 107 W. Va.
563, 149 S. E. 669 (1929), a child
had been born to prosecutrix within one year of separation from her
husband. The court approved the
Mansfield rule, and refused to apply the second statute mentioned
above, arguing that the suit was
not one in which one spouse was
called to testify against the other
since it was neither against the
husband or wife, but against a
third party. A similar technic was
used to reach a contrary result in
State v. McDowell, fOl N. C. 734,
7 S. E. 785 (1888). But in Illinois
the Bastardy Statute (ILL. STATE

(1935) c. 17, §6), making the wife a competent witness
on all issues, permits the testimony
of non-access. However, when the
husband of the prosecutrix testified that he was not the father, the
admission of such testimony was
held reversible error: "by no law
has the common-law rule as to the
husband been removed to allow
him to testify to his non-access at
the time of the conception of the
child." People v. Dile, 347 Ill. 23,
179 N. E. 93 (1932).
Some states rely solely upon
bastardy acts to admit testimony
of non-access. In all other proceedings, however, the Mansfield
rule retains its influence. In New
York the non-access of a husband
may be shown by a wife only in
prosecutions under the Bastard,
Act. The statute referable to paternity proceedings reads: "If the
mother is married both she and
her husband may testify to nonaccess." INF. Crim. CTs. ACT (Gilbert, 1936) art. 5, §67. In City of
New York v. Zizzo, 260 N. Y. S. 169
(1'932), the wife's testimony was
admitted. However, in the case of
In re Barthels Estate, 177 N. Y. S.
565 (1919), an action arising upon
the distribution of an estate, the
court said, "for reasons of public
decency and morality, a married
person cannot say that an offspring
is spurious." Cf. In re Smith's Estate, 242 N. Y. S. 464 (1930). Indiana and Massachusetts are other
states in which the Mansfield rule
has a similar anomalous status.
Evans v.. State, 165 Ind. 369, 75 N.
F. 651 (1905); Kreighbaum v. Dinsmore, 88 Ind. App. 693, 165 N. E.
526 (1929); Commonwealth v. Circo, 199 N. E. 896 (Mass. 1936);
Taylor v. Whittier, 240 Mass. 514,
134 N. E. 346 (1922).
There thus seems to be a general
BAR STATS.
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reluctance on the part of courts to
abandon the precedent set by Lord
Mansfield, especially in the absence
of statutes. Does it not seem peculiar, however, that the best qualified witnesses, the husband 'and
wife, should be prohibited from
testifying as to whether or not an
offspring is spurious?

beyond the power of Congress.
Sonzinsky v. United States, 57 S.
Ct. 554 (1937).
The Supreme Court in refusing
to consider the unexpressed regulatory aspects of this taxing statute
merely conformed to its policy of
long standing, first clearly expressed in the early case of Veazy
Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. 533 (1869).
GERAID MILLuw.
There, in commenting upon the
contested federal tax on state bank
NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT-TAx ON currency, the Court said, "It can
Dw.AEPs.-[Federal] The extend- hardly be doubted that the object
ing arm of federal control in the of this provision was to inform the
suppression of organized crime and proper authorities of the exact
the public interest therein renders amount of paper money in circusignificant the recent decision of lation with a view to its regulation
the Supreme Court of the United by law." Yet, since the statute on
States upholding the constitution- its face was no more than an exality of Section 2 of the National cise tax, its constitutionality was.
Firearms Act. 48 Stat. 1237 (1934), sustained. Compare the statements
26 U. S. C. A. §=1B2a (1935). This of District Judge Ritter in another
section imposes a $200 annual li- case sustaining the National Firecense tax on dealers handling cer- arms Act: "Te (Act] is a revenue
tain types of firearms, essentially measure. Back of it may have been
sawed-off shotguns and subma- a motive to prevent racketeers,
chine guns, defined in Section 1. bank robbers, and desperadoes
Violations of the Act are punish- from obtaining sawed-off shotguns
able hy a fine of $2,000 or imprison- and machine guns to run wild in
ment for five years or both.
crime and to enable the governPetitioner, who was convicted by ment to trace ownership; but where
the District Court for Eastern Illi- there is a power to tax, which
nois of unlawfully carrying on the from a reasonable construction can
business of dealer in firearms with- be construed to be the intention,
out payment of the special tax, was the imposition of the tax is the degranted certiorari solely on the termining feature and cannot be
question of the constitutionality of treated as being without the power
Section 2 of the Act, the conviction because of the destructive effect of
on a count involving that section exercise of the authority upon the
alone having been sustained by the article or business connected therecircuit court of appeals, 86 F. (2d) with." United States v. Adams, 11
486 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936). The Su- F. Supp. 26, 218 (S. D. Fla. 1935).
preme Court held that the imposi- The Court rejected defendant's
tion of a $200 annual tax on dealers contention that the Act violated the
in firearms is constitutional as a Second Amendment to the Constivalid exercise of the taxing power tution preserving the right of citiof Congress, refusing to look be- zens to bear arms, stating that it
yond the face of the Act to con- refers only to the militia.
Federal regulation of other disdemn it as a regulation of matters

140
favored articles through the taxing
power has long received the sanction of the Supreme Court. The
suppression of oleomargarine products in favor of butter by an equalizing tax on the former was held a
constitutional exercise of the federal taxing power in the famous
case of McCray v. United States,
195 U. S. 27 (1904); Vail Butterine
Co. v. Reinecke, 39 F. (2d) 1076
(1931); Cf. In re Kollock, 165 U. S.
And the source of
526 (1897).
federal control over narcotics is
found in the several excise taxes
on producers, importers, dealers,
etc., of narcotic drugs imposed by
the Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act.
That Act was initially held constitutional in the case of United
States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86
(1919) and has been repeatedly
sustained up to the present. See
Watson V. United States, 16 F. (2d)
52 (1926), cert. denied, 274 U. S.
739. The National Firearms Act
closely follows in form the Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act as amended.
It may safely be stated that the
attempts by Congress to regulate
in forbidden fields through the taxing power have failed when the
taxing act expresses regulation on
its face. Such was the case in
United States v. Constantine, 296
U. S. 287 (1935), where a special
annual excise tax of $1,000 on retail liquor dealers when they operate contrary to state or municipal law was held a penalty rather
than a tax, the effect being to usurp
the police powers of the states,
rendering the Act unconstitutional.
Similar holdings may be found in
the Child Labor Tax case, 259 U. S.
20 (1922), and Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936)
(Guffey Coal Act unconstitutional).
Although petitioner here was indicted in a second count for vio-
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lation of Sections 3 and 4 of the
National Firearms Act, the circuit
court of appeals held that the evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction thereunder. The Supreme Court thus had no opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality of these sections. Section 3 imposes a patently prohibitive tax of $200 upon each transfer
of a firearm described in Section 1,
and Section 4 requires identification of purchasers, including their
fingerprints. Section 3 is more
open to the interpretation of being
a penalty than is Section 2, especially in the light of the fact that
the Treasury reports for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1936, showed
some revenues from the tax on
dealers of $3,965, and from manufacturers $1,176, ;whereas but one
purchaser paid the $200 transfer
tax and filed. his fingerprints and
photograph. See N. Y. Times, November 6, 1936, at 52. This article
quoted a member of the Department of Justice as saying: "We
certainly don't expect gangsters to
come forward to register their weapons and be fingerprinted, and a
$200 tax is frankly prohibitive to
private citizens. . . . The purpose
of the act was to give us a check
on all weapons being manufactured
and to permit us to prosecute any
person found in possession of an
unregistered weapon."
The Supreme Court has noted,
in sustaining the Harrison AntiNarcotics Act, that its provisions
have produced substantial revenue
and contain no regulatory matter
beyond that necessary to administer the tax. Alston v. United States,
274 U. S. 289 (f927). Since Sections 3 and 4 of the Firearms Act
seemingly produce little or no revenue, and their regulatory features
are more apparent than Section 2,
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it is quite possible that the Court
would refuse to sustain this portion
of the Act.
[Recently the attorney general
has asked Congress to require every
owner of a rifle, shotgun, revolver
or pistol to register his weapon
with the bureau of internal revenue. A tax of one dollar would be
payable for every firearm sold. The
attorney general stated that this
legislation would broaden the scope
of the present Act and "would
place a potent weapon against
criminals in the hands of law-enforcement officers." See Chi. Daily
News, May 4, 1937, at 4.]
ALvAH ROGERS, JR.

fender, where the charge was not
too serious, to pass sentence but
suspend the execution thereof during good behavior. However, in
Ex parte United States, 242 U. S.
27 (1916), the Supreme Court denied the federal courts' right to
thus suspend sentence no matter
how justifiable the circumstances.
It was announced to be the court's
duty to sentence and commit the
defendant to prison the moment he
either pleaded or was found guilty.
In 1925 Congress, by enacting
the Probation Act (43 STAT. 1259
(1925), 18 U. S. C. A. §724 (1927),
provided that a trial court, in the
proper instances, shall have power,
"after conviction or after a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere . . . to

suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and to place the
eral] On February 2, 1936, de- defendant upon probation for such
fendant was indicted for violation period and upon such terms and
of the National Motor Vehicle Act; conditions as they may deem best."
on February 15th he pleadedguilty Just when Congress intended this
and two days later the district power to be invoked- may be incourt sentenced him to one year in ferred from the reports of the comthe federal prison camp, but re- mittee that drafted the Act: "The
tained jurisdiction, referring the result of long experience with the
case to the probation officer. The probation system shows that it is
defendant was remanded to the far easier to reclaim an unhardened
custody of the marshal for execuearly offender without commitment
tion of the sentence. The proba- to prison than after it." House Retion officer made his report on July port No. 1377, 68 Cong., 2d. Sess.
15th and the court ordered the (1925). From this it would seem
defendant to be placed on proba- to have been the Congressional intion for the remainder of the sen- tent to keep those entitled to protence. The government's motion to bation out of prison and away from
vacate the order was denied [and experienced criminals. Has this
an appeal was taken].
United purpose been acknowledged?
States v. Wittmeyer, 16 F. Supp.
In United States v. Murray, 275
1000 (D. C. Nev., 1936).
U. S. 347 (1927), the Court, in
Originally there was no statutory denying probation to one who had
probation under the federal prac- served part of his sentence, said:
tice, but the courts themselves "Probation was not sought to
FEDERAL PROBATION AcT-PROBATION AFTER ComuinnTwrr.-[Fed-

adopted their own remedy through
the medium of indefinite suspension
of sentence. Thus it became the
practice in the case of a first of-

shorten the term. .

.

The begin-

ning of the service of the sentence
in a criminal case ends the power
of the court even in the same term
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to change it." This language is undoubtedly much broader than was
required for the decision, but it has
been.followed except in the case of
the reduction of sentence in the
same term. Thus in United States
v. Bentz, 282 U. S. 304 (1931),
where the defendant had been sentenced to ten months in prison, and
in the same term, after commitment, he petitioned the court for
a reduction, the sentence was reduced to six months. However, in
Mouse v. United States, 14 F. (2d)
202 (D. C. Kan., 1926), and in
Davis v. United States, 15 F. (2d)
697 (W. D. Ark., 1926), probation
was denied the defendants because
they had served part of their sentences; the trial court was held to
have lost jurisdiction upon commitment of defendants and passage
of the term. This position is
strengthened by the case of In re
Edelson, 15 F. Supp. 1086 (M. D.
Pa. 1936), where the court was
held to have the power to place the
defendant on probation even after
the expiration of the term provided
he had not begun service of his
sentence; and in United States v.
Praxulis, 49 F. (2d) 774 (W. D.
Wash. N. D. f931), it was held
where service of sentence was begun that the prisoner's remedy was
either by parole or pardon.
From this it seems clear that the
court's jurisdiction in the instant
case ceased by the commitment of
the defendant and the expiration
of the term; but may the court, by
merely stating to do so, reserve
jurisdiction to investigate the advisability of probation? This right
seems to have been denied, in substance, in Archer v. Snook, 10 F.
(2d) 567 (N. D. Ga. 1926). In this

case the defendant was sentenced
to two years in prison but was to
be placed upon probation for the
remainder of the term after having
served six months. In holding the
order for probation void the court
said that interference with the execution of sentence after commitment should not be attempted "unless by the clearest legislative warrant." This "warrant" was found
to be lacking in the Probation Act.
In United States v. Greenhaus, 85
F. (2d) 116 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936),
the court held an order for probation nugatory when service of part
of the sentence was a condition
precedent and was entered upon.
To the same effect is White v.
Burke, 43 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A.
10th, 1930). What possible distinction can be drawn between the
above sentences and the one in the
instant case? Both seem to encounter the criticism of Judge Silby as expressed in the Archer case:
"By their incarceration, the shame,
stigma and criminal contact, which
the probation system sought in
proper cases to avoid, will have
already been accomplished."
If a court invokes the authority
given by the Act, its wording
should be strictly followed. It is
there provided that probation may
be granted after conviction or after
a plea of guilty. But this must be
done by the suspension of either
the imposition or execution of the
sentence. Since imposition or execution of sentence necessarily occurs before commitment, the statute apparently requires the granting of probation prior thereto.
Mere reservation of jurisdiction in
the sentence itself would not seem
to authorize later suspension.
JomH McNERNiEY.

